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Abstract This note argues that spatiai considerations and travel costs should be
taken into account in devising tax/subsidy regulations for island-based tuna fisheries.
In particular, the effect of a landings tax on distant fishing grounds should be
considered when setting the level of the tax. A fuel subsidy is suggested as a means of
offsetting the impact of the landings tax on marginal grounds.
Introduction
In a recent paper Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell (1987) propose a tax on landings as a
means of achieving an optimal level of effort in the Maldivian tuna fishery. They de-
scribe the fishery as being conducted within a range of 25 km from the atoll reef, and
elsewhere they explain that because of the lack of ice the boats travel to and from the
fishing grounds each day that they fish (Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell 1986). Travel cost
is obviously an important consideration in this fishery but Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell
(ST) make no provision for it in their model. The purpose of this note is to show that the
"optimal" tax calculated by ST is excessive for most areas of the fishery, and to suggest
altemative and more efficient ways of regulating the fishery.
The ST Model
As explained by ST, it is unlikely that the tuna stock in the region will be affected by the
fishing effort of the Maldives. Assuming that applying increasing amounts of effort to a
fixed stock of fish results in diminishing marginal productivity of effort, the catch/effort
relationship can be expressed as
h = a - be-'"^ (1)
where h is the rate of harvest, E is the rate of effort, and a, b, and k are positive
constants. For estimation purposes, ST allow a i^ b because they are interested in ob-
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taining an approximation to the relationship over the relevant range. If, however, a zero
level of effort is to correspond to a zero level of harvest, it is necessary to restrict a = b
and we will employ this restriction in our analysis.
ST choose E to maximize the following expression.
IT = ph - cE (2)
where p is the price of tune determined in world markets, t is the proportionate ad
valorem tax, and c is the unit cost of effort. Because ST note in their earlier paper that
fisheries contribute 45% of Maldivian employment, we might question the assumption
that the opportunity cost of effort is independent of the level of effort devoted to the
fishery. (This point was made by Geoff Waugh in discussion with one of the authors.)
However, because the focus of this note is the importance of travel costs, we will
continue to assume that all inputs are supplied to the fishery at parametric prices. Be-
cause the equilibrium level of effort in an open-access fishery is determined by the zero-
profit condition, the optimal tax in the ST model is the solution to
Pil - t) h(E*) - cE*
where £* is the level of effort that maximizes profit.
Travel Costs
The travel costs incurred by a vessel are of two kinds: the opportunity cost of time and
the cost of fuel while traveling at speed to and from the chosen fishing ground. We
assume that a vessel costs C, per day to operate plus the cost of travel at speed. The cost
of a day's operations when ground / is chosen is;
C,. = C, -H 2Q4. (3)
where Cj is the cost per kilometer of traveling at speed, and 2rf, is the length of the return
trip to ground i. If the vessel travels at S kilometers per hour and the length of the
working day is A^ hours, the proportion of the day spent fishing is
Combining (3) and (4) gives an expression for the cost per unit of effective effort in
ground /:
" NS - 2^,.





Figure 1 Solutions to pbke *^' = pak - kr-; £,.
The Revised Model
We can now consider the tax that will produce an optimal level of effort in fishing
ground i. The optimal level of effort is given by the solution to
- r, = 0 (6)
The optimal tax on harvest in fishing ground / is given by the solution to
p{\ - ti) (a - 6e-*«(*) - rfif = 0 (7)
where £^ •= (I/A:) \n(pbklr^. In the absence of a tax the open access equilibrium level
of effort in ground i, E°°, is given by the solution to
pbke'""' = pak - (8)
The solutions are illustrated in Figure 1 where it can be seen that E°° > Ef when there
is no landings tax. From (7) it can seen that the optimal tax in ground i is
p{a -
(9)
If landing taxes are to be used to obtain all the potential rent from the fishery, it is clear
from (9) that a different tax will be required on harvest from each ground. It can be
shown that dt'ldrj < 0, indicating that the optimal tax will be highest in the closest
ground. The extensive margin of tiie fishery is where tiie optimal level of effort tends to776 H. E Campbell and R. K. Lindner
zero. From (6) this oecurs where r^ = pbk. This means that the optimal tax on landings
in the farthest ground is
/* = 1 - lim
Using l'Hopital's rule, the optimal value of t* can be seen to be zero. In the elosest
ground, the value of r, becomes c, and the optimal tax becomes the one calculated in the
ST paper.
Policy Alternatives
It is clear that the policy recommended by ST will not distribute effort optimally over the
fishing grounds. Marginal grounds will be excluded from the fishery because of the tax,
and in those grounds that are fished effort will be too low except in areas directly
adjacent to the atoll reef. A policy of imposing a landings tax differentiated by area of
harvest may be difficult, it not impossible, to operate. If a single tax on landings is to be
used it should be one that trades off efficiency gains in the nearby fishing grounds
against losses in the distant grounds. This will be a lower tax than the one recommended
in the ST paper. A policy that is potentially more efficient than a single-tax policy is one
that offsets the effect of the single tax on the amount of effort applied to distant grounds
by means of a subsidy on the price of boat fuel. Such a subsidy would reduce the unit
cost of effective effort, r,, by a greater amount for distant than for nearby grounds,
thereby encouraging the exploitation of distant grounds. Before this potentially more
efficient tax/subsidy scheme could be introduced additional research on travel costs
would be required.
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